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The Politics of Knowledge: British Colonial Codification of 
"Customary" Irrigation Practices in Kangra, India 
Mark Baker 
Forest Community Research 
ABSTRACT 
Colonial administrative rules in British India were often based on customary laws, considered to be 
important components and manifestations of the collective structure and history of communities. The 
requisite colonial knowledge for these rules was sought through the codification of Indian social cus-
toms, practices, and law. However, the project of gathering colonialist knowledge about "authentic" 
Indian traditions was fraught with challenges and contradictions, many of which are illustrated in this 
analysis of the codification of irrigation customs associated with the kuhls (gravity flow irrigation sys-
tems) of District Kangra. The Riwaj-i-Abpashi (Irrigation Customs), first compiled as part of the 1874 
revised settlement of District Kangra and later revised in 1915, arose out of the desire by British colonial 
administrators to control and regulate the expansion of irrigated agriculture in order to generate greater 
revenue. This required the codification of irrigation customs, both for purposes of taxation and to 
resolve future water conflicts . Exceeding 700 pages in length (including maps), this text describes the 
origins and history, location, command area and methods of construction, and inter-village rights and 
responsibilities associated with the more than 715 multi-village kuhls in Palampur and Kangra tehsils of 
District Kangra. It also includes a glossary of specialized irrigation terminology and a section on the 
customary rules governing the construction of new kuhls. The extraction and classification of local 
irrigation knowledge and rights that the Riwaj entailed shifted power relations among local groups 
(generally in favor of already dominant groups), undermined the basis of authority of the kohli 
(watermaster), shifted the terms and contexts of water disputes from local, oral, and civil to general, 
written, and state-centered, and expanded the presence and influence of the state at the local level. 
However, rather than a unilateral extraction of information and revenue, the codification of custom also 
created new arenas for expressing and negotiating local claims to water. In recent years some irrigators 
have been able to defend successfully their water rights claims against competing state claims, using the 
colonial codification of their rights as the basis for their claims. 
Colonial administrative rules in British India were of-
ten based on customary laws. The requisite colonial knowl-
edge for this was sought through the codification of Indian 
social customs, practices, and law. From the tenure of 
Warren Hastings, the first Governor General of India, 
through to the last colonial census of India in the twentieth 
century, British rule in India was characterized by exhaus-
tive efforts at cataloguing, classifying, and codifying cus-
tom. In large part this effort was motivated by the search 
for principles of law upon which to govern and adjudicate 
disputes. The orientalist scholars of the eighteenth cen-
tury studied the Sastras and Koran and consulted with pun-
dits in their search for authentic knowledge about Hindu 
and Muslim customs and law. By the nineteenth century, 
when the frontier of colonial rule had shifted from Bengal 
to the Punjab, the orientalist scholar had been replaced by 
the settlement officer in rural villages who interviewed vil-
lage elders about their customs as they practiced them. 
These were then recorded in the wajib-ul-arz (village ad-
ministration papers) or Riwaj-i-Am (Customary Law) and 
used as the basis for allocating land rights in land and re-
solving disputes. In Bengal as well as the Punjab the search 
for authentic customs as the basis for law was based on the 
assumption that customary laws were important compo-
nents and manifestations of the collective structure and 
history of communities. This assumption justified their 
cudification and incorporation into formal legal frame-
works.1 
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The project of gathering colonialist knowledge about 
"authentic" Indian traditions was fraught with challenges 
and contradictions, not the leas t of which included the plu-
rality and changing nature of customary practices, the in-
herent relations of domination and subordination that char-
acterized interactions with colonial authorities, the strate-
gic, pragmatic decisions villagers and village elders made 
about how to represent themselves to colonial rulers, and 
the various and at times conflicting frames of reference 
. and conceptual assumptions of those who codified custom 
(particularly the debates between conservative traditional-
ists and utilitarian positivists and liberals) (Cohn 1987; 
Dirks 1985; Guha 1981; Raheja 1998). Thus, the codifi-
cation of custom was not an objective, transparent, and clear 
"snapshot" of social practices, unencumbered by concep-
tual filters, contrary to the views of conservative colonial 
administrators who held that the purpose of state interven-
tion was only to discover, record, and systematize custom . 
British land settlements are good examples of the in-
tended and unintended consequences associated with the 
codification of custom . The primary purpose of the land 
settlement process was to determine the nature of property 
rights in an area, identify rights holders, and establish rev-
enue rates and payment schedules . In areas where irriga-
tion augmented natural rainfall, the settlement report for a 
village would also include a description of the manner of 
irrigation, the area inigated, irrigation rights, and some-
times notes on the social organization of irrigation man-
agement. Although ostensibly an exercise in elucidating 
and recording a region's customs and laws relating to land 
rights, cultivation, and the distribution of agricultural sur-
pluses, land settlements were heavily influenced by pre-
vailing European social theories concerning private prop-
erty, investment and productivity, anthropological theories 
about social evolution, and the successes and failures of 
prior settlements in other regions of India , all cloaked in 
the guise of debates over what constituted "local custom" 
(Baden-Powell 1892; Guha 1981). 
The nineteenth century land settlements in the Punjab 
illustrate some of these themes . In the Punjab the settle-
ment process, informed by an anthropological focus on 
genealogy and agnatic relationships, defined village prop-
erty rights in terms of blood ties and patriarchy. This con-
solidated the land rights of coparcenary communities and 
' The approach to custom as the basis for colonial law was 
assailed by utilitarian positivists who criticized this use of tradi-
tion because of its inherently conservative bias. Mill an9 other 
utilitarians influenced by Bentham argued that law should be a 
liberal force of social change. The responsibility of law-makers 
was not to search for "true" and "authentic" custom, but to de-
velop laws as they should be, consistent with the universal prin-
ciples of reason and utility, not tradition and custom (Battacharya 
1996:24). 
weakened the rights of persons unable to establish a ge-
nealogical link to the original founder of the village. The 
"native voice," as it was filtered and interpreted during the 
codification and settlement process, was a "male, patriar-
chal voice, the voice of the dominant proprietary body 
speaking against the rights of non-proprietors, females, and 
lower castes" (Battacharya 1996:47) . The rights to land 
held by non-agriculturalists and by women were consider-
ably weakened during this process. And because rights to 
common property resources were based on ownership of 
agricultural land, the claims of women and non-agricultur-
alists to common property resources were also substantially 
undermined. These exclusionary effects have current rel -
evance. For example, only those households whose an-
cestors' names appear in the list of proprietors included in 
Anderson's 1894 Kulu forest settlement are considered 
valid rights holders and thus eligible for compensatory re-
muneration in exchange for the annulment of their rights 
as part of the establishment and management of the Great 
Himalaya National Park.2 
In District Kangra, Himachal Pradesh, the land settle-
ment process included the codification of irrigation rights. 
However, the village-by-village approach to recording ir-
rigation information employed in most areas of nineteenth 
century Punjab was unworkable in District Kangra. In 
Kangra, the kuhls (farmer-managed gravity flow irrigation 
systems) that irrigate rice and wheat fields were and still 
are exceedingly complex. They constitute a dense web of 
interlocking iiTigation systems and channels etched into 
the landscape. Often one village uses water from several 
different kuhls to irrigate fields at different elevations, or 
concomitantly one kuhl might iiTigate fields in as many as 
30 or 40 different villages. The management of multi-vil-
lage kuhls requires inter-village coordination for channel 
repair and maintenance and water distribution. A record of 
rights at the village level would thus reveal only a partial 
picture of inigation organization and management. Real-
izing the limitations and inadequacies of village-level in-
formation, the settlement officer responsible for the 1874 
revised settlement of District Kangra had prepared a wa-
tershed-scale record of inigation rights for the two tehsils 
(subdistricts) with the greatest density of irrigation net-
works-Palampur and Kangra. The resulting compendium, 
known as the Riwaj-i-Abpashi (Irrigation Customs), de-
2 Descendents of those families whose names do not appear 
on the list (most likely women-headed households, non-agricu l-
turalists, and lower caste households) do not qualify for any com-
pensation or government subsidies, even though from a 
usufructory standpoint, both they and their ancestors could have 
been as intimately engaged in the management and utilization of 
resources currently within the park boundary as those whose fam-
ily names appear in Anderson's settlement (see Saberwal and 
Coward, this issue). 
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scribes the origins and history, location, command area, 
methods of construction, and inter-village rights and re-
sponsibilities associated with the more than 715 multi-vil-
lage kuhls in Palampur and Kangra tehsils . The Riwaj-i-
Abpashi also includes a glossary of specialized irrigation 
terminology and a section on the customary rules govern-
ing the construction of new kuhls. The corresponding in-
formation regarding the more than 1500 smaller kuhls that 
irrigate one village or less was compiled as part of each 
individual village's settlement papers. The Riwaj-i-Abpashi 
was revised in 1915. The revised volumes are stored in the 
sub-district revenue department offices and are still used 
as the basis for adjudicating water disputes between and 
within villages. 3 
The Riwaj-i-Abpashi is a unique text because it repre-
sents an unusual, almost encyclopedic, compendium of de-
tailed information from the late nineteenth century about 
what had hitherto been orally transmitted knowledge re-
garding local irrigation practices and customs. Within the 
context of small-scale, farmer-managed gravity-flow irri-
gation systems worldwide, and certainly within the South 
Asian context, such a document is comparatively rare. In 
this paper I examine the Riwaj-i-Abpashi from multiple 
perspectives. First, from an information standpoint, the 
text yields insight into the historical role of the state in 
kuhl management as well as the role of horizontal networks 
in enabling kuhls to persist despite perturbations such as 
floods and earthquakes. The contemporary implications 
of both insights are briefly touched upon. Secondly, I ex-
amine the Riwaj-i-Abpashi in relation to colonial agrarian 
policies , ideas about property, and the tensions and contra-
dictions inherent in attempts to codify custom. Thirdly, I 
explore the text as part of the broader project of creating 
colonialist knowledge about India. Despite the text's self-
presentation as an ostensibly transparent, apolitical, and 
impartial document, it is a colonial intervention, inherently 
bound to relations of domination, subordination, and rep-
resentation. I attempt to uncover some of the transactional 
pragmatics (Raheja 1998) that governed the collection of 
information it contains and to discuss the social conse-
quences that resulted from the codification of this local 
knowledge system. 
Insights from the Riwaj: state involvement and social 
networks 
A review of the information the Riwaj-i-Abpashi pro-
vides for each of the approximately 715 multi-village kuhls 
3 The Riwaj-i-Abpashi is hand written in Urdu. Because the 
number of Urdu speakers is declining, Hindi and English transla-
tions of the text were provided to the district and tehsil offices of 
the Revenue Department in an effort to e·nsure access to this docu-
ment. 
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in Kangra and Palampur Tehsils reveals the dominant role 
that pre-colonial state authorities played in some aspects 
of the construction and management of some kuhls. This 
belies the conventional wisdom that "traditional" or "com-
munity-man(jged" irrigation systems operate independently 
of higher levels of authority and governance. Instead, the 
Riwaj-i-Abpashi notes that pre-colonial mountain rulers 
sponsored the construction of eighteen kuhls in Palampur 
and Kangra Tehsils, were involved with kuhl management, 
and occasionally adjudicated conflicts between upstream 
and downstream kuhls during periods of water scarcity. 
While state-sponsored kuhls represent a tiny fraction of 
the total number of multi-village kuhls, they are the long-
est kuhls in the region, both in terms of length and com-
mand area. Their main-stem length often ranges from 
twenty to forty kilometers, and they convey irrigation wa-
ter to several thousand hectares scattered across as many 
as fifty or sixty different hamlets. Coward (1990:82) sug-
gests that some kuhls may actually have been the property 
of the Rajas who sponsored their construction, and that local 
elites may have held private property rights in the kuhls 
whose construction they sponsored; most kuhls were owned 
by the inigators themselves as a form of common prop-
erty. The bundle of ownership rights in kuhls was distrib-
uted in remarkably diverse ways across different kuhls. 
Because the state received twice as much revenue from 
irrigated land as it did from unirrigated fields (half of the 
gross production, compared to as little as one quarter on 
uninigated plots), it seems safe to assume that one reason 
for sponsoring kuhls was to increase revenue. Another 
motivation may have been to increase the ruling lineage's 
support and strengthen its political legitimacy. The ben-
efits ofkuhl water were enjoyed by a wide variety of people; 
artisans, traders, and shopkeepers, in addition to agricul-
turalists, benefited from the water a new kuhl brought. 
State-sponsored investments in irrigation systems that ben-
efited a wide diversity of people likely increased support 
for the local ruler. 4 Sponsoring the construction of a kuhl 
also strengthened the legitimacy of the raja's rule amongst 
the kuhl beneficiaries, as attested by stories from the Kangri 
oral tradition. Furthermore, by naming kuhls after them-
selves, rulers ensured that their name would endure. 
Pre-colonial rulers were involved with the management 
of some kuhls. In the southern part of Kangra District bor-
dering the Punjab plains, the ruler or his agent appointed 
individuals, known as kohlis or watermasters, to be in 
charge of water distribution and kuhl maintenance andre-
4 Kuhl water satisfied all domestic water needs such as cook-
ing, washing (utensils, persons and clothes), and watering live-
stock and the small kitchen garden invatiably found near the do-
mestic compound. Kuhl water was also used by members of the 
basket making caste, and kuhl hydropower was used to tum 
potter's wheels and to husk and grind grain . 
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pair. During the colonial period this practice was discon-
tinued and the farmers themselves began to choose their 
own watermasters, consistent with the practice elsewhere 
in the district. These are the kuhls that Coward suggests 
may have been owned by local rulers prior to settlement, 
whose ownership was perhaps transferred to the water us-
ers who were then reconstituted as rights holders (1990:82) . 
The Riwaj-i-Abpashi also notes instances in which pre-co-
lonial rulers exercised their authority to resolve upstream/ 
downstream disputes between different kuhls, especially 
during periods of low water flow. Rulers would appoint 
an agent charged with apportioning water between upstream 
and downstream kuhls to ensure that the irrigators of up-
stream kuhls did not divert all of the scarce water from the 
feeder streams. This pattern of state involvement contin-
ued into the colonial period. 
These examples of state sponsorship of kuhl construc-
tion, state involvement in kuhl management and conflict 
resolution, and possible state ownership of kuhls suggest 
that while most of the kuhls in Kangra were managed most 
of the time without any state involvement, for some kuhls 
and at some times the pre-colonial state did play important 
roles. The temporal and substantive diversity of precolonial 
state involvement in irrigation management in Kangra, and 
in other "community" managed irrigation systems such as 
in southern Tamil Nadu (Mosse 1997), suggests that pre-
vailing views that tend to dichotomize state and locally 
managed irrigation systems as discrete entities do not ac-
curately represent the nature of state-local relations for ir-
rigation management. The plurality of state roles in "lo-
cal" irrigation management in Kangra described in the 
Riwaj-i-Abpashi suggests that effective state intervention 
will take different forms in different places. This indicates 
that joint irrigation management and other contemporary 
models for devolving authority to local inigator groups for 
irrigation system management will not be effective unless 
they incorporate a range of possible state roles in local ini-
gation management. 
A second insight that emerges from the Riwaj-i-Abpashi 
concerns the ways in which inter-kuhl coordination reduces 
the destructive impacts of sudden shocks such as floods 
and earthquakes. Each year during the monsoon season 
the mountain streams from which kuhls divert water be-
come raging and turbulent torrents that often destroy the 
kuhl's diversion dam and upstream channel portion. Oc-
casionally landslides in the narrow headwater canyons cre-
ate temporary dams that, upon bursting, send a destructive 
wall of mud, water, boulders, and trees downst;·eam. Less 
frequent, but also destructive, are earthquakes that i·umble 
through the seismically active Himalaya mountain range. 
The Riwaj-i-Abpashi notes the influence of these environ-
mental shocks on kuhls and describes instances in which 
coordination between individual kuhl systems helped to 
mitigate the destructive effects of floods . For example, it 
notes that the diversion structures for 22 kuhls were shifted 
(generally upstream) due to changes in the course of the 
river following floodin g. It also mentions several instances 
in which, after a destructive flood or earthquake, adjacent 
kuhls that used to be managed independently became jointly 
managed. This joint management often entailed sharing a 
diversion structure and main channel section, with collec-
tive responsibility for its repair and maintenance, along with 
shared participation in the annual kuhl-related rituals. The 
role and importance of horizontal networks of local irriga-
tors in kuhl persistence, especially under conditions of pe-
riodic flooding and/or earthquakes, as described in the 
Riwaj-i-Abpashi was confirmed during fieldwork (Baker 
1994). Networks of inter-kuhl social relations facilitate 
the mobilization of labor following a destructive flood or 
earthquake and create the necessary social context to en-
able joint kuhl management and inter-kuhl water transfers. 
The potential for coordination and exchange among adja-
cent community-based natural resource management sys-
tems to promote their persistence tends to be underesti-
mated; focusing on individual resource systems may mask 
the importance of wider networks of cooperation and con-
flict in which individual systems may be embedded. 
The Riwaj-i-Abpashi and British theories of property 
While the Riwaj-i-Abpashi provides insights into com-
munity-managed irrigation systems, it also exemplifies 
colonial notions of property and the importance the colo-
nial administration attached to clearly defined property 
rights as the precursor to revenue collection and agricul-
tural development. Indeed, the primary motivation for the 
compilation of the first edition of the Riwaj-i-Abpashi in 
1879 was to facilitate and control the expansion of irriga-
tion in the region. This was linked with a set of wider 
agrarian policies aimed at agricultural expansion that in-
cluded monetization of the economy and the production of 
agricultural surpluses-in short, the rationalization of the 
agricultural production system and the imposition of a co-
lonial development regime (Ludden 1992). The corner-
stone of these policies and a necessary step prior to the 
assessment of tax rates was the recording and protection of 
rights in land. The assumption underlying the codification 
of property rights was that clear property rights and mod-
erate assessments would inevitably lead to greater invest-
ments in agr~ultural productivity. This was the basis of 
the early British criticism of the manner of revenue collec-
tion prevailing in Kangra when they wrested control of the 
region from Sikh rulers in the mid-nineteenth century. 
Known as the Sikh farming system, it entailed payment by 
a wealthy individual to the government a fixed amount of 
revenue annually for a set number of villages. This person 
in turn attempted to maximize his profit by taxing the vil-
lages at often unsustainably high rates and retaining the 
difference between what was collected and what he had 
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contracted to pay the government. This short-term profit 
maximization approach, colonial administrators believed, 
mitigated against long-term investments for increasing ag-
ricultural productivity and provided perverse incentives for 
short-term profit. 
Following the assumption of British control of Kangra 
in 1846 the first settlement officer initiated a series of ad-
ministrative policies designed to create the conditions nec-
essary for agricultural development consistent with pre-
vailing utilitarian theories . The settlement officer, G.C. 
Barnes, fixed the revenue for twenty years in order to en-
courage investment in agriculture, commuted revenue pay-
ments in kind to cash, and initiated an exhaustive inquiry 
into the nature of property rights in Kangra (Barnes 1855). 
Although authorized only to record pre-existing custom-
ary land rights as the basis for British taxation, Barnes trans-
formed the nature of rights in land in Kangra. 
The colonial state, rather than legitimating pre-exist-
ing property rights systems (their stated intention), wrought 
dramatic changes in the nature of property in private culti-
vated land and collectively used uncultivated areas (the 
"waste"). Prior to the first settlements in many areas of the 
Punjab, cultivating households held allotments of land 
(shares) that consisted of strips of land of equivalent pro-
ductivity.5 Appurtenant to these shares were proportional 
rights in the village commons or the uncultivated areas 
known as shamilat. Shares in the commons included usu-
fruct rights to graze and collect wood as well as the right to 
break up and cultivate a household's "share" of the com-
mons . Based on the size of their shares, allotment holders 
jointly contributed labor for collective investments in agri-
culture such as masonry wall building for i1Tigation, and 
they paid, generally in-kind, the revenue assessments of 
the pre-colonial state. The fu·st regular settlements of the 
Punjab divided this agricultural community into two groups, 
cultivators and tenants, according to principles of ancestry 
that previously had no bearing on the work of agriculture 
or the allotment of rights in the commons, nor on the 
corporateness of the community of cultivators. Cultiva-
tors who were descendants of the founders of the village 
were classified as landowners, or proprietary rights hold-
ers, while cultivators who were not members of the found-
ing lineage were classified as either hereditary or at-will 
tenants, depending on the number of years (twelve) they 
had been cultivating their allotment. Furthermore, because 
tenants were now no longer classified as shareholders, their 
shares (rights) in the village commons "passed into 
oblivion" (Smith 1996:32). Thus, the colonial administra-
tion had redefined the village community on the basis of 
5 The allotment of shares was made on the basis of the pro-
ductive capacities of individuals; it was subject to periodic 
reallottment, as those productive capabilities changed over time 
(Smith 1996:33). 
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genealogy, rather than on the actual pattern of land use based 
on allotments; in the process, "non- landowning" families 
were disenfranchized from legitimate use of uncultivated 
areas. 6 While the effects of these transformations in prop-
erty rights are most evident with regards to forest resources 
and the ability to expand agricultural production, they also 
affected the context of irrigation management. 
Other effects accompanied the first regular settlement. 
In Kangra, as in the plains districts of the Punjab, the "an-
cient and time-honored custom" of paying rent in kind was 
reversed by commuting in-kind to cash payments (Barnes 
1855:52). The switch from in-kind to cash payments was 
consistent with the prevailing utilitarian philosophy of agri-
cultural development in Europe. That Barnes embraced 
this philosophy is strongly suggested by his comments on 
the effects on farmers of substituting cash for in-kind pay-
ments: "it has taught them habits of self-management and 
economy, and has converted them from ignorant serfs of 
the soil into an intelligent and thrifty peasantry" (1855 :52) . 
The cultivated area in Kangra also increased after the 
first settlement. By 1890 it had increased eight to ten per-
cent. Hill slopes that had been infrequently cultivated pre-
viously were terraced and cultivated annually, and forested 
areas were converted to agriculture. This agricultural ex-
pansion, consistent with that described by Chakravarty-
Kaul ( 1996) for most of the Punjab, but on a much smaller 
scale, was facilitated by a provision of the first regular settle-
ment that shifted the authority to control the expansion of 
agriculture into uncultivated areas from the ruler to the land-
holders of a hamlet. This "revolution in the old state of 
property" (Lyall1874: 19) converted the landholders of each 
hamlet into a co-proprietary class and transferred to them 
ownership rights in the uncultivated areas to which they 
had previously only had usufruct rights.7 By converting 
usufruct rights into ownership rights, treating landowners 
as co-parcenary groups that were now jointly responsible 
for paying the land revenue and granting them the aggre-
6 Smith notes that "In the ideal conception now, a village 
community was defined by descent from a village founder, ... 
Having a share in common property was considered the sign of 
superior status in a village, as a member of the ancestral core of 
proprietors whose genealogy and history were now matters of 
official record (1996:47). Similarly: "A village community is a 
body of proprietors who now or formerly owned a part of the 
village lands in common, and who are jointly responsible for the 
payment of the revenue" (Douie 1899:61). 
7 This transfer of property had many implications. It nulli-
fied the rights of landless households to forest resources collected 
from unenclosed uncultivated areas . Revenue from these areas, 
previously paid to the ruler, was now collected by the lambardar 
(village tax collector) and distributed to all landholders in pro-
portion to the amount of revenue each paid. And now landhold-
ers, rather than the state, had the authority to grant permission to 
an individual to reclaim and cultivate an uncultivated tract. 
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gated right to collect certain miscellaneous rents from the 
waste, the settlement process, in effect, created a type of 
community which had hitherto not ex isted (Chakravarty-
Kaul 1996:75).8 
The transfer of rights to landholders may have been an 
unintended consequence of the application of land use cat-
egories from the plains to the hill states, or it may have 
been an intentional, if implicit, policy to promote agricul-
tural expansion and intensification by simplifying the pro-
cess of bringing new areas under cultivation and more in-
tensively using already cultivated areas. Evidence suggests 
that it may have been the former. In the Punjab, early vil-
lage settlements were conducted by field surveyors (known 
as amins-derogatively referred to as a "host of harpies" 
by a contemporary British settlement officer) from the 
Northwest Provinces (NWP) who went from settlement to 
settlement working on a pro-rata basis (Smith 1985: 159). 
As the village-level record of rights (known as the iqrar-
nama, and later, wajib-ul-arz) in Kangra was most likely 
drawn up by itinerant amins from the NWP, there would 
have been a high likelihood of importing land use catego-
ries from the plains to the hills. Barnes' admonition to a 
subdistrict Tehsildar "to write down the actual practices as 
observed ... and not to fill up details (of the iqrar-nama) 
after his own imagination" ( 1855 :67) suggests that this was 
a real threat. This possibility is made more plausible by 
the fact that Barnes noted that in the preparation of the 
record of rights for each hamlet he himself gave the sub-
ject headings and elicited information with questions and 
even suggestions. Even if trained local patwaris (village 
Revenue Department accountants), and not itinerant mnins, 
did compile the record of rights in Kangra, the possibility 
for importing non-local forms of property was high be-
cause the patwari training manual "Educational Course for 
Village Accountants" was based on the author's experi-
ences in the NWP. Furthermore, the author, Ram Saran 
Das, was transferred from the NWP to oversee settlement 
operations in the Cis- and Trans-Sutlej territories follow-
ing their acquisition by the British after the 1846 Sikh War. 
Therefore, whether the Kangra Settlement was conducted 
by amins from the NWP or by patwaris whose training 
was based on Ram Das's manual, land use categories from 
the NWP could easily have been transfened to Kangra de-
spite the lack of local referents for those categories. 
The history of the term "shamilat," referring in Kangra 
to village common property, exemplifies this process. 
8 During the pre-colonial period revenue was assessed on the 
basis of cultivated area per family holding, not village-wise as in 
the plains. This reflects the severalty model of tenure known as 
"raiyatwari" (Baden-Powell 1892:Il:537) that existed in Kangra 
piior to British rule. In this system holdings were separate and 
not part of a joint estate, there was no joint responsibility for rev-
enue payment, nor were there joint shares iri the waste that could 
be partitioned accordingly. 
Shamilat is a term that was imported from the plains. There, 
it was used to refer to the uncultivated common lands within 
a village and also to the large expanses of uncultivated ar-
eas in the drier western and southwestern portions of the 
Punjab that were primarily used as grazing lands by tran-
shumant nomadic groups. Throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury and especially during the latter decades of the century, 
British agrarian policy in the Punjab, articulated through 
the land settlement process, sought to reduce the extent of 
both of these categories of shamilat. This occurred through 
processes of enclosure and privatization and conversion of 
village shamilat from pastoral to agro-pastoral and agri-
cultural land use. State investment in canal irrigation dur-
ing this period, combined with the practice of granting large 
tracts of newly-irrigated land at low rents to dominant 
groups, further reduced the extent of uncultivated land and 
the customary rights of grazers who had previously de-
pended on those areas (Gilmartin 1994; Ludden 1999). 
Property rights in shamilat resources were converted from 
"communal control and joint use to individual property and 
limited access" (Chakravarty-Kaul 1996:25). While these 
policies contributed to dramatic increases in the region's 
cultivated area during the late nineteenth century, they also 
weakened village communal resource management insti-
tutions, dramatically reduced the extent of shamilat areas, 
displaced pastoral and agro-pastoral people, and weakened 
the property rights of non-landowning groups in the vil-
lage commons. 
In Kangra, the term shamilat was first introduced as a 
land use category during the first regular settlement; it had 
no pre-British referents in Kangra. 9 The introduction in 
Kangra of shamilat as a land use category encouraged the 
expansion of agriculture because it conferred on landhold-
ers the right to break up and cultivate previously unculti-
vated areas, free of extra revenue, for the duration of the 
settlement. With one stroke of the pen, usufruct rights to 
uncultivated areas had been converted to proprietary rights 
and the basis of ownership narrowed to agnatic relations 
with a founding ancestor. How did this occur? Twenty 
years after the first settlement Lyall argued that landhold-
ers had not manufactured their own title to the wastes by 
putting "shamilat" in the village record of rights, but rather 
that "the real inventors of the definition (of shamilat) were 
the native officials and clerks who worked under Mr. 
Barnes" ( 1874:3 1), who had inserted shamilat as the head-
ing in the village records .10 
9 See Srnith ( 1996, Chapters I and 2) for an insightful dis-
cussion of the distinction between the colonial definition of 
"shamilat" and the pre-colonial nature and extent of rights in the 
commons in the Punjab plains. 
10 This was consistent with colonial policy encouraging agri-
cultural expansion and conversion of forests to agricultural lands 
in other regions during the preceding decades, such as the Ganga-
Jamuna doab (Mann 1995:211-212). 
BRITISH CODIFICATION OF IRRIGATION PRACTICES IN KANGRA, INDIA/Baker 31 
Following the transfer of rights in uncultivated areas 
from the state to the newly-created community of co-pro-
prietary landholders and its designation as "shamilat," 
Revenue Department officials attempted to privatize as 
much of it as they could. Barnes described how he ap-
proached areas described as sha111ilat in the following man-
ner: 
Whenever ... I saw an opportunity, I insisted on a 
partition of the estate according to the number of 
shares. Every inch of profitable ground was divided 
and allotted to one or another of the co-partners. I 
ignored as far as my means would allow the very 
name of "Shamilat," for experience has assured me 
that the smallest portion left in common will act as 
a firebrand in the village. It is sure to lead to dis-
sension, and forms, as it were, a rallying point for 
the discontented and litigious to gather round 
(1855:67). 
Quite possibly the "discontented and litigious" people 
Barnes referred to were those whose usufruct rights had 
been nullified through the vesting of common lands in the 
community of landowners, as had occurred on the Punjab 
plains. 
The politics of recording irrigation rights 
It was as part of the effort to record rights in land that 
irrigation rights were first recorded and published in 1879. 
By this time the effects of a fixed revenue, in combination 
with rising grain prices and improved transportation, had 
resulted in agricultural expansion and the construction of 
new kuhls; progress, consistent with India's development 
regime, was taking place. In order to exercise control over 
the construction of new kuhls as well as to resolve con-
flicts over irrigation rights, existing kuhls were mapped 
and attested records of irrigation rights were compiled. This 
constituted the first edition of the Riwaj-i-Abpashi. 
Recording customary irrigation rights provided almost 
as many opportunities for transforming irrigation rights as 
had the recording of land rights twenty-five years earlier. 
As with other efforts to codify custom, colonial adminis-
trators portrayed codification as transparent, noninterven-
tionist, and apolitical. This facade of neutrality conceals 
the politics of recording custom and the transactional prag-
matics (Raheja 1998) that invariably accompanied the self-
representation of tradition to colonial rulers. Indeed, the 
creation of colonial knowledge was a form of intervention, 
inherently bound to relations of domination, subordin(;ltion, 
resistance, and representation. As Battacharya notes, "the 
rhetoric of custom becomes a new language of power and 
legitimation" (1996:21) . The Riwaj·i-Abpashi also repre-
sents an attempt to incorporate a pre-colonial knowledge 
system into the broader superstructure of colonial rule, and 
to harness that system to the larger project of increasing 
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agricultural production . The Riwaj-i-Abpashi "designated 
certain practices as belonging to a time apart from and be-
fore colonial rationality, and it tried to bring them into the 
present constituted by colonial rationality by codifying 
them, in what it thought was their ineducibility, within 
colonial rationality" (Skaria 2000:271). 11 
Settlement officers began by asserting state title to 
streams and rivers. They argued that state claims to the 
natural waterways of the district represented a continuity 
rather than a change from previous customs. Lyall (1874 :56) 
wrote that, 
In order to retain in its hands the power of making 
new iiTigation channels where needed, the Govern-
ment directed all Settlement Officers to assert its 
title to all natural streams and rivers . In Kangra the 
title of Government, by old custom of the country, 
was particularly clear, and I accordingly asserted it 
subject, however, to existing rights of use possessed 
by shareholders of canals, owners of water-mills, 
or persons entitled by custom to erect "chip" or fish-
weirs in certain places .. .. ... The actual beds of 
streams and the water in them belong to the Gov-
ernment. (emphasis added) 
Settlement officers attempted to ascertain the irrigation 
customs and practices relating to a specific kuhl by calling 
a public meeting in one of the villages irrigated by the kuhl 
in question and asking those who came to describe their 
irrigation customs and practices. After they were written 
down, they were read aloud, suggested changes were in-
corporated, and then local elites and village leaders attested 
to the veracity of the statement with their thumbprint or 
signature. The resulting document constituted a legally 
binding record of rights. Lyall himself acknowledged the 
difficulty of such an endeavor. He admitted that "probably 
these statements are sometimes incorrect. . . . [T]he cus-
tom is often vague and difficult to define" (1874 :243) . 
While inigation customs may have appeared vague to a 
settlement officer who may not have known the local moun-
tain dialect, one wonders if they appeared equally vague to 
the farmers whose harvest depended on reliable water sup-
plies? Or, factions well represented at the general meeting 
11 In his essay "Cathecting the Natural," Skaria identifies the 
Riwaj-i-Abpashi as an example of "technologies ofprimitivism"-
those elements of the natural that are necessarily produced by 
and incorporated within the Indian nation-state and its develop-
ment regime. Skaria argues that the idea of development, with its 
attendant notions of progress, time, modernity, and the nation-
state, requires primitivism. Primitivism is necessary as the "other" 
of development. The Riwaj-i-Abpashi, as a technology of primi-
tivism, is incorporated within, and yet remains separate from, 
colonial or post-colonial rationality. Thus it simultaneously ex-
emplifies a "superceded past" and enables "the extension of the 
power of development regimes" (2000:272). 
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may have presented the settlement officer with a picture of 
rights in a kuhl that favored their own interests . The Riwaj-
i-Abpashi occasionally explicitly acknowledges these con-
fli cts ; in some cases after describing inter-village ri ghts 
and responsibilities with regards to a specific kuhl, it notes 
that members of a hamlet contested the version of ri ghts 
that were recorded and refused attestation. On-going liti-
gation concerning contested water rights is mentioned in 
the Riwaj-i-Abpashi. Social groups appear to have taken 
full advantage of the new arena to assert competing claims 
to kuhl irrigation water and to negotiate favorable rulings 
regarding inter-village distribution of responsibility for kuhl 
maintenance and repair. 
The process of recording iiTigation rights created new 
arenas for negotiating water rights between different water 
users and between water users and the government. Groups 
that were in conflict over water allocation probably saw 
the creation of the Riwaj-i-Abpashi as an opportunity to 
solidify their contested water claims, or at the very least to 
express their discontent with the existing manner of water 
distribution. In one case, that of Kanduhl Kuhl, the Riwaj-
i-Abpashi describes the distribution of water between 
twelve different villages in terms of the numbers of days 
and nights each village can claim the kuhl 's water and in 
what order. In also mentions that a measured portion of 
the kuhl's flow is to be reserved always for the village of 
Kandwari, whose local elite in the late eighteenth century 
mobilized labor to repair the previously defunct kuhl and 
then named it after their village. The text notes that the 
residents of Kandwari contested the water rights the other 
villages claimed and argued that these villages were claim-
ing new rights that had not existed in the past. It also states 
that farmers from three villages alleged that the residents 
of a cluster of four villages were claiming water rights ear-
lier in the season than was their right . The entry for this 
kuhl concludes by noting that the claims of the cluster of 
four villages were rejected, and that all present except the 
residents of Kandwari agreed to the final statement of rights . 
A reference to an 1889 civil court case concerning 
Kandwari 's rights to the kuhl 's flow indicates that the con-
flict between Kandwari and neighboring villages had been 
ongoing. 
The process of recording liTigation rights provided some 
groups with an arena for advancing new water claims 
(which may or may not be recognized as legitimate) and 
for debating old water conflicts. The negotiations that oc-
cun·ed during the preparation of the record of rights were 
important, as no doubt the participants recognized, because 
the written record became the template against which fu-
ture disputes over water were to be resolved, as it remains 
today. In many cases it served to reinforce dominant power 
relations that existed at the time of its preparation, thus 
strengthening the position of local elites and weakening 
the basis for future counterclaims. 
One example of this is a kuhl known as Sappruhl Kuhl , 
named after the Girth (agricultural caste) clan that con-
structed the kuhl in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth 
century. Before bringing water to the Girth village, the 
constraints of elevation and gravity dictated that it flow 
through an upstream high caste Rana village. The Riwaj 
notes that the Ranas forcibly appropriated all the kuhl 's 
water, killed some of the Girths, and forced the rest to leave 
the area . While higher-caste Rajputs now live in the area 
that the Girths left and use water from this kuhl, conflicts 
with the upstream Ranas continue to this day and require 
the downstream Rajput farmers to carefully organize wa-
ter guarding by patrols of six to eight pairs of male water 
guards armed with staves round the clock. The act of writ-
ing did not solidify previously fluid relations, but it did 
serve to further marginalize already marginal groups and 
strengthen the dominant position of others . This is the bias 
inherent in any process that seeks to codify custom, and 
this is why liberal utilitarians fought against the codifica-
tion of custom as the basis of colonial rule. 
The recording of irrigation rights was not only imbri-
cated in local processes of negotiating water rights, it also 
contributed to the decline of the kohli's (watermaster) au-
thority. The kohli was responsible for mobilizing labor for 
annual kuhl maintenance and repair, the performance of 
ritual aimed at ensuring adequate water and warding off 
destructive floods, the supervision of water distribution 
within the kuhl and resolution of related conflicts, and oc-
casionally coordination with other up- and downstream 
watermasters. The codification of custom created an alter-
native repository of knowledge regarding water rights, the 
Riwaj-i-Abpashi, that constituted legitimate evidence in an 
alternative dispute resolution arena- the district courts. As 
alternative, state-sanctioned sources of expertise and con-
flict resolution mechanisms, they tended to undermine the 
specialized knowledge of the kohli and his ability to re-
solve conflicts in local resolution arenas. The creation of a 
competing source of expertise and a competing arena in 
which that expertise circulated weakened the power of the 
kohli to resolve disputes. The long term decline of the 
kohli's authority, more recently exacerbated by recent re-
gional economic changes, especially the increasing impor-
tance of nonfarm employment and remittance income, ex-
tends back to the codification of irrigation custom. 
The emergence of the district court as an alternative to 
local dispute resolution arenas has several implications. 
First it suggests that the codification of irrigation custom 
did not necessarily ossify fluid social relations, as has some-
times been argued regarding the effects of colonialist knowl-
edge, but rather that it helped to create a new arena within 
which to negotiate contested social claims to water. This 
new arena operated according to a different legal logic and 
jurisprudence tradition than had existed previously in this 
region . To operative effectively within this arena required 
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a different set of skills and forms of expertise. Kuhl com-
mittees are an organizational form that emerged in the mid-
twentieth century partially in response to the exigencies of 
interacting within these new bureaucratic arenas. Kuhl 
committees are similarly structured formal organizations 
with elected officers and extensive written records, whose 
purposes include the effective representation of the inter-
ests of the kuhl 's irrigators in court and lobbying the dis-
trict administration for grants for kuhl repair. Committees 
also serve as a vehicle for defending water rights in court. 
For example in the late 1980s farmers whose water supply 
was threatened by a government-sponsored expansion of 
an upstream kuhl formed a kuhl committee for the express 
purpose of representing their interests in court. They suc-
cessfully sued the state of Himachal Pradesh. The lawsuit 
hinged on the Riwaj-i-Abpashi, which described the na-
ture of the farmers' water rights, including injunctions 
against upstream diversions that might threaten the kuhl 's 
water supply. In this case farmers used the colonial codifi-
cation of their "customary" water rights and a "modern" 
dispute resolution forum to successfully defend their "tra-
ditional" water rights against the state's attempts to expand 
irrigated agriculture and promote development. 
Conclusion 
The Riwaj-i-Abpashi arose out of the desire by British 
colonial administrators to control and regulate the expan-
sion of irrigated agriculture in order to generate greater 
revenue. This required the codification of liTigation cus-
toms, both for purposes of taxation and the ability to re-
solve future water conflicts. The creation of the Riwaj-i-
Abpashi was part of the broader project of codifying and 
systematizing customary practices as one of the founda-
tions of colonial rule. The history of the use of the term 
"shamilat" in Kangra indicates the vagaries of that pro-
cess. The extraction and classification of local inigation 
knowledge and rights that the Riwaj represents shifted 
power re lations among local groups (generally in favor of 
already dominant groups); undermined the basis of author-
ity of the kohli; shifted the terms and contexts of water 
disputes from local, oral, and civil to general, written, and 
state-centered; and expanded the presence and influence 
of the state at the local level. However, rather than a uni-
lateral extraction of information and revenue, the codifica-
tion of custom also created new arenas for expressing and 
negotiating local claims to water. There is a wry it·ony in 
the fact that in recent years some irrigators have been able 
to successfully defend their water rights claims against com-
peting state claims using the colonial codification of their 
pre-colonial irrigation practices and customs. While it 
stands in stark contrast to the exclusive list of proprietors 
in Anderson's Kulu settlement and the exclusionary effects 
of using that list to define legitimate beneficiaries of GHNP-
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related compensation programs and policies, one wonders 
if there might be other instances in which the incorpora-
tion within colonial (and post-colonial) rationality of cus-
tomat·y rights and practices provides footholds for chal-
lenging undemocratic state actions that threaten environ-
mental values and discriminate against relatively disenfran-
chised groups. 12 
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